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Building the Idea of the Common
Good in People’s Democracies
A Case Study of Communist Czechoslovakia in the 1950s1
Édification de l’idée d’intérêt général dans les démocraties populaires : le cas de
la Tchécoslovaquie communiste dans les années 1950
Roman Krakovský
1 In  November  1948,  the  city  council  of  Ruzyně,  a  village  on  the  outskirts  of  Prague,
discussed  new  regulations  concerning  quotas  of  lard.  The  issue  provoked  a  lively
discussion  which  testified  to  growing  tension  among  local  councillors  as  political
inequalities increased following the communist seizure of power. One of the councillors,
the craftsman Mr Vohánka,  expressed little surprise upon seeing how much the new
measures were welcomed by Mr Valeš, his colleague from the Communist Party, since “he
doesn’t  breed  animals  and  therefore  he  will  have  nothing  to  pay.”  He  struggled  to
understand as well why he should be “treated the same way as a farmer who doesn’t fulfil
his quotas.” He mentioned that as a craftsman, he “doesn’t receive any rationing tickets,
allocated only to the working class” despite the fact that he “doesn’t count his shifts.” Mr
Valeš replied that from now on everybody should benefit from pig‑breeding and “not just
the very few and always the same people,” as the pig “is fed with surplus which belongs
to all !” Tempers flared and voices rose. The regional representative and the mayor, both
communists, intervened and reprimanded the craftsman for his offensive talk “against
the new measure and consequently against the new government.” “The decision is fair,”
concluded the mayor, because it gives “everybody a piece of meat, not like before, under
bureaucracy and capitalism, when all went to very few and nothing to the others.”2 
2 This trivial quarrel occurred at the moment when the coalition government led by the
Czechoslovak Communist Party was shifting to the “dictatorship of proletariat.” What
was to be the basis for the relationship between state and society, and among citizens in
general, in this new regime ? How were personal and collective liberties defined in this
new  political  environment ?  And,  on  the  whole,  how  was  this  new  political  system
institutionalised while its popular support was, at the very least, doubtful ? 
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3 An examination of the public sphere can help answer some of these questions. The public
sphere remains a relatively recent subject in the historiography of communism. In the
past, it was often analysed as a physical space (place, street) under the regime’s direct
control.3 But this material definition underestimates a fundamental part of the problem :
the nature of the citizens’ community and the role of politics.4 In order to consider these
issues,  it  is  necessary to return to the concept of public sphere developed by Jürgen
Habermas (Öffentlichkeit). Habermas defined the public sphere as “a realm of our social
life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed.” It comes into being
“in every conversation in which private individuals assemble to form a public body […]
and  confer  […]  about  matters  of  general  interest.”  It  requires  specific  means  for
transmitting information such as newspapers and later radio, television or internet, a
certain level of education, and free access to this sphere guaranteed to all citizens. This
area is distinct from the state : it is a “site for the production and circulation of discourses
that can in principle be critical of the state.”5 
4 From the very beginning,  Habermas made it  clear that  the concept of  the bourgeois
public  sphere  was  elaborated  in  a  specific  context :  the  French,  English  (and  partly
German) liberal bourgeois societies of the 17th‑18th centuries. Several population groups
were excluded from it (depending on education level, social status, sex or race), although
these exclusions tended to diminish over time.6 Other forms of public spheres existed as
well, such as the proletarian public sphere.7
5 Industrialization, democratisation and the development of the welfare during the 19th
 century  led  to  the  transformation of  the  bourgeois  public  sphere.  Progress  in  mass
education and the development of print media considerably expanded participation in
public discussion and led to what Habermas called the “plebeian public sphere.” The
economic crisis at the end of the 19th century plus deepening inequalities engendered by
laissez‑faire capitalism favoured the development of state interventionism in economic
and social life. The outcome of this process was the development of industrially advanced
mass democracy, organized in the form of the social welfare state in which state and
society progressively mingled. Group needs which could not expect satisfaction from a
self‑regulating free market now tended towards regulation by the state.  In this  way,
conflicts previously restricted to the private sphere intruded into the public, which had
to mediate these demands. This development led to the establishment of what Habermas
termed the “plebiscitary‑acclamatory public sphere” in the liberal democracies of the 20th
century8. 
6 Habermas based his analysis on West European societies. But what was the situation in
Central and Eastern Europe ? Did the advent of communism in this region lead to similar
consequences ? How was the notion of the common good enacted in regimes advocating
the dictatorship of proletariat and disrespecting fundamental liberties ? To answer these
questions, we will turn to post‑war Czechoslovakia and to the city of Ruzyně and its city
council.9 Indeed,  the local  level  is  a  good observation point.  In  the words  of  a  local
representative of Ruzyně10 in 1945, “What is at stake on a national level is reflected in
local politics.”11 
7 A  city  of  approximately  4,500  residents  (in  1930),  a  large  proportion  of  them
German‑speaking,  Ruzyně  is  at  that  time situated seventeen kilometres  northwest  of
Prague. The town’s development is exemplary of the urbanisation and industrialisation of
Central  and Eastern Europe.  Thanks to its proximity to Prague,  interwar Ruzyně  was
inhabited by workers,  shopkeepers,  and white collar commuters.  The construction of
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Prague’s airport in the late 1950s gave the city a new boost. After the territorial reform of
1960,  the commune was integrated into Prague and its  economic and administrative
development depended henceforth on the capital.
8 One purpose of the public sphere is to allow different political bodies to debate as if they
were socially equal, even if this equality is more ideal than real. The regimes established
in post-war Central and Eastern Europe claimed to have accomplished social equality and
guaranteed widespread participation in decision‑making. Even if in reality this goal was
not  achieved  and  inequalities  simply  shifted  elsewhere,  these  social  transformations
remodelled the functioning of the public sphere.
9 The process of interpenetration of the public and the private and the increase of state
interventionism initiated during the nineteenth century was accelerated following the
Great Depression, the Second World War and particularly the communist seize of power.
Nationalisations and collectivisation led to a massive transfer of property which shifted
the boundaries between the public and the private to the detriment of the latter. The
socialist community took control over numerous private matters and became much more
intrusive in the private life of the individual. How did actors intervening in public adapt
to this situation ? In the Czechoslovak People’s Democracy, the Communist Party was so
closely  identified  with  the  state  that  it  was  often  labelled  a “party‑state.”  How did
different actors communicate in public with this new political body, and how was the
notion of the common good elaborated under these circumstances ? A close examination
of these questions should help to better understand whether Soviet‑type regimes gave
birth to a specific type of public sphere and how it functioned. 
 
New Political Equilibrium
10 By the end of the war, Europe’s political elites were convinced that the existence of large
minorities  within  national  communities  was  one  of  the  leading  cause  of  political
instability. They believed that a better correlation between political and ethno‑linguistic
frontiers might prevent the escalation of violence. Following the liberation, Central and
Eastern Europe underwent significant population transfers, sometimes even more brutal
than  those  during  the  war.  Between  1944  and  1948,  about  31 million  people  were
displaced from the  areas  where  they had lived,  often for  several  generations.  These
transfers were a continuation of the demographic engineering that had begun in Central
and Eastern Europe during the war when more than 15.4 million people were transferred
temporarily  or  permanently  between  1939  and  1943.  If  we  add  the  16.3 million  war
casualties for military, political or racial reasons, almost 62.4 million Central‑Europeans
lost  their  lives  or  were  displaced  in  the  decade  following  1939.  These  demographic
changes substantially altered the structure of citizens’ communities in the region12. 
11 In Czechoslovakia, between 1945 and 1949, the state authorities organised the transfer of
almost  3  million  Germans  and  resettled  1.9 million  Czechs  and  Slovaks  in  liberated
territories. These displaced persons had their personal property confiscated, nationalised
and partially redistributed to the population. If, in 1930, Germans represented 22.3 % of
Czechoslovak population, by 1950, they were fewer than 2 %, relegating to quasi oblivion
the professional, social and cultural presence of a group which traditionally formed the
core of the region’s middle class13. A similar process, although on a smaller scale, was
organised in South Slovakia, where almost 90,000 Slovak Hungarians were expelled to
Hungary in 1946‑1948.14 
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12 Following  this  population  upheaval  and  the  chaotic  period  of  liberation,  certain
categories of population were deprived access to the public sphere. So‑called “unreliable
persons”  (nespolehliví  in  Czech),  a  term  designating  Germans,  collaborators  and
non‑residents  (cizinci,  which  could  also  be  translated  as  “those  whose  origin  is
unknown”),  were among the first targets.15 If  a migrant’s identity had not been fully
investigated and his reliability established, his access to the public sphere was restricted.
In  Czechoslovakia,  residency  permits  –  which  opened  access  to  the  vote  and  to
representative  functions  –  were  only  granted  following  a  “consecutive  stay  on  the
territory of the commune for at least ten years.”16 This measure automatically excluded
from access to public affairs all recent migrants. Similar measures were adopted in other
Central European countries17. 
13 Political pluralism in Central and Eastern Europe was weak before and during the war,
and it was not restored in its aftermath. Traditional right‑wing parties compromised by
collaboration  were  prohibited  and  left‑wing  parties  and,  more  particularly,  the
Communist  Party  and  the  Social  Democrats,  found  themselves  in  a  very  favourable
position. In Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Red Army and officers of the Czechoslovak army in
the Soviet Union played a decisive role in creating new post‑war governance. The old
municipal  and legal  authorities  of  the Protectorate of  Bohemia and Moravia and the
pro‑Nazi  Slovak  Republic  were  dismissed  and  replaced  by  new  ones  called  National
Committees (národní výbory). On December 4, 1944, from his exile in London, President
Beneš legalized these organisations in Czech lands, hoping that their structure would
eventually  evolve  following  the  first  post‑war  democratic  elections.18 Rapidly,  this
decision  was  endorsed  on  Slovak  territory  as  well.19 Between  1944  and  1945,  4855
committees  were  created  across  the  country.  The  Czechoslovak  situation  was  not
exceptional. Similar administrative bodies were created in other countries in the region
following the advance of the liberation armies.20 Within these new administrative bodies,
the  political  equilibrium  had  nothing in  common  with  the  wartime  or  pre‑war
precedents.  In  theory,  all  authorised  political  parties  should  have  been  represented
within National  Committees.  In reality,  the communist  commissaries who established
these  new  administrative  bodies  selected  the  most  obedient  local  political
representatives. Usually, the members of the Communist Party, or at least their allies
from the Socialist National Party, took the leading positions and almost systematically
the chairmanship.21 In this way, a large proportion of the traditional political forces were
excluded from the public sphere well before the first post‑war elections. The situation
was even more apparent in areas where the Communist Party had no representation and
where the Social Democrats had been weak before 1945. Through National Committees,
local public affairs fell into the hands of a new oligarchy of unknown representatives with
often no experience in local governance. 
14 The case of Ruzyně is representative of this process. On 19 May 1945, a public meeting
was organised in the town’s main square by four political parties uncompromised during
the war : the Communist Party, the Social Democrats, the Socialist National Party, and the
People’s Party. After paying tribute to the war’s victims and honouring the Red Army,
“liberating our nation from the seven years of suffering that brutal Nazi rule imposed
upon us”, representatives of the authorised political parties solemnly pledged to “defend
conquered rights and liberties” and to “act according to the tradition of our big brother
nation, the Soviet Union”. The meeting elected the Presidium and the Council of the new
National Committee. Enthusiasm for the return of peace prevailed over democratic rules :
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the vote was public, and the new committee was confirmed by acclamation during the
meeting. Unsurprisingly, the Communist Party won eleven seats, the National Socialist
Party eight, the Social Democrats seven, and the People’s Party four. The chairmanship
went to the communist candidate without a single dissenting vote22.
15 During Ruzyně’s first post‑war municipal election, some of the elected representatives
had to contend with allegations of collaboration. Antonín Petr (Socialist National Party)
was accused of “selling fruit to occupiers and not to Czechs” and Václav Král (Communist
Party)  was  denounced “for  the  same reason.”  The city  council  promised to  examine
carefully  these  accusations  while  inviting  the  population  to  “participate  collectively,
during these difficult times, in the construction of a new foundation for the Czechoslovak
state.”23 The majority of accusations were withdrawn in the following weeks, and the
public  was  notified  in  order  to  reinforce  the  new  representatives’  legitimacy.  In
September 1945, in order to put an end to the wave of denunciations, local councillors
unanimously  adopted  a  resolution  stipulating  that  any  person  “offending  a  public
representative  will  be  prosecuted  judicially  and  politically,”,without  specifying  what
“politically” meant.24
 
Imposition of a New Dominant Political Discourse
16 Issues such as equality and social justice gained a dominant position in post‑war political
discourse.  From  fall  1947  to  February  1948,  relations  between  different  political
representatives  grew acrimonious,  uniting  Communists  and Social  Democrats  against
their  political  opponents.  The  Communist  Party  progressively  gained  control  of  the
management of public affairs and the funding for the reconstruction. In September 1947,
in alliance with the Social Democrats, the Communist Party granted special subsidies to
farmers suffering from poor harvests. “Is it not a noble gesture of the Communist Party
towards the local community and all  its members,  especially the juniors ?” asked the
representative  of  “the  Party,”  mentioned  for  the  first  time  without  the  term
“Communist,” as if everyone knew henceforth what it meant. A noble gesture, indeed, but
in passing, the speaker did not forgot to call attention to the amount of the subsidies.25
The Council approved the funding – the urgency of the reconstruction necessitated a
helping hand – but almost half of the elected representatives abstained from the vote,
well aware of the measure’s political significance.26 
17 During this period, rising antagonism between the Communist Party and other political
forces transformed municipal  discussions into trench warfare.  In December 1947,  the
apartment  of  a  Communist  Party  member  was  inspected by  the  police  following  an
anonymous denunciation for illegal possession of arms. The communist representative
complained to the city council : “The justice was clearly willing to discredit the elected
representative  of  the  people  defending  the  public  interest” !27 Following  a  stormy
discussion,  one  of  the  councillors tried  to  put  minds  at  rest,  stressing  that  it  was
necessary to “abandon partisan interests within the city council” and to “work together
so that  matters  advance in peace.”28 But  this  was increasingly difficult  to guarantee.
While in the immediate aftermath of liberation, the opposition had been able to speak out
against  the  Communist  Party,  it  fell  progressively  silent  through  fear,  weariness  or
opportunism. 
18 People’s Democracies considered social inequalities as one of the leading shortcomings of
bourgeois societies and claimed to overcome them.29 Equality and broadening access to
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the public sphere (mainly for women and the working class) were supposed to reduce
social  differences  and  to  ensure  equal  participation  in  public  affairs.  Did  People’s
Democracies succeed where bourgeois societies had failed ? How did the implementation
of  the “dictatorship of  proletariat,”  the “abolition of  the class  struggle,”  and gender
equality affect the public sphere ? 
19 Since the People’s Democracies suffered “no contradiction between classes,” maintaining
political pluralism was no longer necessary.30 In February 1948, only a few weeks after the
Czechoslovak Communist Party took power, the opposition was progressively expelled
from representative bodies. In Ruzyně, a new city council was elected on 19 March 1948.31
Following the National Front’s proposal, the “reactionary elements which jeopardised the
work of the city council and sabotaged the execution of the Government’s program” were
ousted or forced to join the Communist Party32. It can easily be imagined that ousting all
objectionable representatives was simply not possible on a local level where competency
was a  rare commodity.  Several  expelled representatives  simply joined the remaining
political  forces,  enabling  different  political  opinions  to  be  voiced  within  the  purged
administrations in spite of the challenges. To a certain degree, this helped to preserve
certain pluralism within the local public sphere.
20 Nevertheless,  the predominance of a single political discourse could easily discourage
other speakers from expressing themselves. Modern mass communication tools such as
the press, radio and later television, under state ownership, helped bring a new political
culture to the population. National Committees were also mobilised to disseminate it. In
October  1948,  as  Parliament  approved  new  social  legislation,  Member  of  Parliament
Anežka Hodinová‑Spurná delivered a speech on the radio devoted to the “Solidarity in
the past,  today and in the future” where she stressed how the new law helped solve
“people’s social problems in the name of solidarity and mutual help.” The speech was
broadcast at the opening of the city council’s meeting and the President invited local
representatives of the council to instil these “new values of solidarity” in their citizens.33
The campaigns  to  fulfil  the  regime’s  economic  goals  followed the same principle.  In
springtime  1952,  during  a  public  discussion  between representatives  and  citizens  of
Ruzyně,  the President of the city council  encouraged the crowd to participate in the
harvest :  “I  am sure that those who have not yet contribute will  join us because the
success of the harvest is in the interest of everyone.”34 The omnipresence of this majority
discourse had an obvious influence on deliberation and decision‑making.35 In December
1947, during the aforementioned police inspection of the property of a local communist
representative, his colleague, M. Lousa, protested against what he considered an “insult,”
referring to the “people” who “today enjoy the complete control of the government”. He
suggested that the deputies send a resolution to the Ministry of Justice. By fifteen to
thirteen votes, the proposal was approved.36 It is difficult to determine if this decision
resulted  from a  general  consensus  or  if  it  testified  to  the  influence  of  the  majority
discourse  over  local  deputies.  But  what  is  certain  is  that  when  pluralism  is  not
guaranteed, minorities can be deprived of speech, and when they do manage to say a
word, their voices can fall on deaf ears. In April 1950, a new cooperative was founded in
Ruzyně. After a “lively discussion” the city council “decided to form a cooperative” using
the  land  and  livestock  of  the  farmer  František  Turecký.  Management  of  this  new
organisation was entrusted to comrade Dupáč,  of “working‑class origins.” The former
dispossessed  owner  was  not  even  invited  to  the  deliberation,  and  the  decision  was
approved by the local representatives “by common consent.”37
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Mechanisms of Social Stratification and Political
Participation
21 One of the leading factors that shaped the form political communities took in post‑war
Central  and  Eastern  Europe  was  the  transfer  of  property.  This  was  the  outcome  of
long‑term processes  that  became more  significant  in  the  1930s.  Following  the  Great
Depression, state interventionism increased, and the nationalisation of certain leading
sectors  was  introduced  in  many  Central  and  Eastern  European  countries.  The
germanization of economies during the war intensified this process, as German capital
became a major financer and the industrial capacity of Central European economies was
mobilised for the war effort. By the end of the war, about 50 % of the industry of the
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia was under German control, as well as almost all
mines and the cement and paper industry. In Slovakia, which became a satellite of the
Reich during the war, German capital in industry increased from 4 % in 1938 to 52 % in
1942. This germanization familiarised local economies with the principle of planning and
accelerated the transfer of property to the state, and this development intensified with
the large‑scale nationalisation and collectivisation campaigns of the post‑war period.
22 In Czechoslovakia, nationalisation began in summer 1945 and by December 1945, 2,900
industrial companies employing almost 60 % of the industrial workforce were already
under state control. In Prague, 26,000 private companies existed in 1948 ; six years later,
there  were  no  more  than  5,700.38 As  a  result  of  these  consecutive  processes,  social
differences levelled considerably, and wealth became a less important criterion of social
differentiation.
23 Due to the war and the liberation of Central and Eastern Europe, relatively homogenous
national communities were thus created. But at the same time, these new communities
remained  fragile.  Traditional  solidarities  were  deeply  shaken,  the  middle  classes
decimated, and a significant proportion of local communities comprised recent residents
with restricted civil rights. Political representation did not reflect all political opinions,
and  the  public  sphere  became  progressively  dominated  by  a  discourse  stressing
egalitarianism and social justice. While wealth lost its importance as a leading factor of
social  differentiation,  class  became progressively  more significant.  The public  sphere
gained progressively a  more proletarian character,  which challenged participation in
public discussion.
24 In  order  to  defy  inherent  social  inequalities,  parliamentary  democracies  aspire  to
maintain  the  separation  between  political  parties  and  economic,  social  and  cultural
institutions. While the first promote political equality and usually operate in public, the
second are  more  dedicated to  the  private  sphere.  The  development  of  organisations
where individuals were enrolled on the basis of sex, age or socio‑professional status led
during the late 19th and first half of the 20th century to the interpenetration of state and
society and blurred public‑private distinction. In Central and Eastern Europe, social and
political transformations experienced during the after‑war period made this separation
even more problematic.
25 The  very  structure  of  the  National  Committees  confirmed  the  leading  role  of  the
Communist  Party.  In  1951,  the  city  council  of  Ruzyně  was  composed  of  fourteen
representatives  of  the  Communist  Party,  four  representatives  of  trade  unions,  five
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members of the local cooperative, and three members of the army. The Youth Union, the
sport  organisation  Sokol,  and  the  Popular  Party  had  one  member  each.39 The
representatives of the Women’s Union took part to discussions as well. The incorporation
of mass organisations into the city council had a decisive impact on the functioning of the
local public sphere. The role of these mass organisations was not to represent citizens’
political opinions in public but to “defend the interest of the working class,” to “gain its
confidence,” and to supervise it.40 The participation of these organisations, more or less
voluntary, was based on both political and apolitical criteria, the latter being connected
to  profession,  age  or  gender.  This  political  representation  based  on  social  and
professional criteria introduced into the socialist public sphere the structural inequality
of status of its members. 
26 The case of women’s representation is exemplary of this process. People’s Democracies
considered  the  growth  of  women’s  representation  as  clear  evidence  of  the
“democratisation” of politics. On this point, they consolidated the principles which were
already in practice in most Central and Eastern European countries.  In Russia and in
Poland, women had been granted the right to vote in 1918, followed closely by Hungary
(1919),  Czechoslovakia  (1920),  and  Romania  (1921).41 New civil  codes  adopted  at  the
beginning  of  the  1950s  reorganised  family  relations,  marriage,  and  child  custody
following a fairly progressive Soviet marital model from the 1920s based on the principle
of a partnership of equal individuals sharing common interests and mutual affection.42
The principle of gender equality was restated in the first socialist constitutions as well.43
On  this  basis,  women’s  representation  in  politics  did  improve  after  the  war.  In
Czechoslovakia, women represented 12 % of members of Parliament between 1948 and
1954, and this ratio increased to 23 % in the 1980s, while it had never exceeded 5 % before
1939.44 In Hungary, women represented 17 % of members of Parliament in 1953. 45 The
growth  of  female  representation  in  politics  was  indeed  an  important  step  forward,
allowing women to better  articulate  their  demands.46 A  close  examination of  several
women  holding  ministerial  positions  –  such  as  members  of  Parliament  Anežka
Hodinová‑Spurná,  Ludmila Jankovcová or Marie Švermová in Czechoslovakia or Anna
Ratkó and Valéria Benke in Hungary – would help to better understand women’s role in
developing legislation and give a better sense for how women’s views were incorporated
into the political life of the People’s Democracies.47
27 But the representation of women in public must be examined at the local level as well.
When it  was created in 1945,  the National  Committee of  Ruzyně  counted no women
councillors. In 1946, three out of thirty members were women and in 1949, they were five
(17 %) – a proportion that remained stable throughout the 1950s.48 The number of women
representatives  in  city  council  also  increased  thanks  to  three  representatives  of  the
Women’s Union, bringing the number to eight women for twenty‑five men (25 %). In the
1970s, the ratio in local administrations fluctuated from 21 % to 28 % and reached an
average 30 % on a departmental and a regional level.49 
28 How  was  this  increase  in  women’s  representation  perceived  in  this  traditionally
masculine  public  sphere ?  Reports  of  municipal  deliberations  in  Ruzyně  appear  to
confirm that it did not generate much noise. But in order to understand if women’s voices
received  the  same attention  as  men’s,  it  would  be  necessary  to  go  further  into  the
analysis,  for  example  by  examining  the  nuances  of  tone  and  gesture  that  typically
accompany speech. While this is rarely possible on a local level, where a full transcript of
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deliberations is seldom available, it would be perfectly possible on a national level, where
the parliamentary discussions were recorded in extenso. 
29 In addition, women were recognised as political actors partly on a gender basis. Indeed,
while women were numerically better represented during deliberations, Women’s Union
members were not granted the right to vote. Furthermore, female representatives usually
enjoyed higher representation within the commissions handling food supply, health or
education,  social  and  cultural  affairs.  Were  they  more  competent  in  these  matters ?
Perhaps to a certain extent. But the fact that they were systematically excluded from
commissions  dealing  with  budget,  planning  or  industry  marginalised  them from the
regime’s high priority areas. In this regard, the inherent difference between men and
women was institutionalised in the public sphere. 
 
Imbalance of Decision‑Making
30 In Czechoslovakia, the transformation of National Committees in accordance with the
Soviet model was conducted through several administrative reforms. A new Constitution
defined in 1948 National Committees as organs “representing and executing the power of
the state on a local, departmental and regional level” and “protecting the rights and the
liberties of the people.”50 Subsequent reforms – the most important in 1948, 1954 and
1960 – followed two contradictory processes : the decentralisation of decision‑making and
the centralisation of resources.51
31 One effect of these administrative reforms was to considerably enlarge the scope of the
National  Committees’  competencies.  National  Committees  now  took  charge  in  areas
previously managed by other administrative bodies or ministers : culture and education
(excluding  higher  education)  and  related  services  (canteens,  kindergartens,  student
dormitories,  etc.),  labour  protection,  public health,  social  services,  local  finances,
economy and agriculture, construction and collectivisation, the organisation of socialist
competition on the local level, etc. The National Committees took charge of the approval
of the economic plans and annual budgets of all companies based within their jurisdiction
52.  In  1958,  the  Ministry  of  Local  Development  was  dissolved,  and its  responsibilities
transferred to local administrations. 
32 But  despite  their  broadened  competencies,  municipalities  disposed  of  few  financial
resources  to  put  them into practice.  Within the planned economy,  their  budget  was
allocated by superior authorities such as departmental or regional administrations or
ministries.53 In practice, this meant that even if the local city council was competent in
the field, superior authorities could interfere in the process of decision‑making at any
moment through the allocation of resources. In this way, the “dictatorship of proletariat”
was  transformed into  a  political  bureaucracy  where  networking  and  membership  in
different political organisations gave access to benefits and, consequently, to power.54 
33 If  the  context  of  widespread  shortage  reinforced  this  decision‑making  imbalance,
successive  administrative  reforms  rendered  it  irreversible.  In  Czechoslovakia,  the
administrative reform of 1960 reduced the number of departments from 270 to 109, and
the number of regions from 19 to 10. With a short interlude of 1969‑1970, when as part of
a federalisation process the regions were abolished, this administrative division remained
in place until the partition of Czechoslovakia in 1992. 
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34 This process reinforced the development of parallel decision‑making channels. In order
to defend local issues, representatives had to bargain with the state and the Communist
Party  off  the  beaten  track.  In  October  1952,  a  Ruzyně  councillor  comrade  Strnad
participated in a political education seminar. There, he met a Ministry of Public Health
representative with whom he “discussed in detail the situation of the town regarding
health care.” He secured a promise that the department would send a replacement for the
local doctor, or at least an auxiliary.55 
35 The spectacular expansion of local administrations’ competencies transformed them into
a “basis of the power of the people” and a “pillar of the building of socialism.” It also
strengthened interactions between local community members. But at the same time, it
isolated them. Instead of encouraging the autonomy of local representatives, it displaced
power  to  departments  and regions,  disconnected from the  local  context,  and to  the
Communist Party. Collaboration between communities on the same administrative level
was  entirely  organised  by  the  state  and  was  progressively  ritualised.  Campaigns  of
emulation between towns are an example of this process. Eventually, the socialist public
sphere reinforced the isolation of its members. 
 
The Public‑Private Distinction
36 In People’s Democracies, the separation between the public and the private was shaped
decisively  by  the  transfer  of  property  undertaken  through  nationalisations  and
collectivisations  before,  during,  and  after  the  war.  In  the  context  of  post‑war
reconstruction, the majority of the population considered nationalisations as an effective
weapon against economic crisis.  Accordingly,  the process met with little criticism. In
Czechoslovakia,  the  trials  of  collaborators  and  the  resettlement  of  German‑speaking
populations, who traditionally formed the core of the middle class, facilitated the transfer
of property.56 
37 The population adapted to this new situation. On a local level, discussions concerning
nationalisations of industry rarely led to conflict. It never occurred in Ruzyně. On the
contrary, the nationalisation of real estate and collectivisation, launched in spring 1949,
met strong resistance : both affected personal ownership, fundamentally related to the
family. Collectivisation was often imposed by administrative decisions, and farmers were
frequently forced to join cooperatives. In Ruzyně, the National Front Action Committee
carried out an inspection on the farm of František Turecký. The police, escorted by a
member of the city council, “discovered twelve quintals of wheat and one quintal of
barley concealed in the basement.” Following this find, the Action Committee proposed
nationalising the farm. After a lively discussion concerning whether it was appropriate to
keep  the  former  owner  in  position  in  order  to  secure  the  functioning  of  the  farm,
Ruzyně’s  representatives  decided  to  endorse  the  recommendation  of  the  Action
Committee and to place the former owner “at the state’s disposal.”57 
38 The  population  of  Ruzyně  appealed  massively  to  the  authorities  to  revoke  such
administrative decisions. But only few appeals succeeded. In February 1950, following
numerous  demands  to  restore  confiscated  property,  Ruzyně  city  council  agreed
unanimously that a positive response to such demands was “not to be desired anymore.”
The  seized  properties  were  integrated  into  communal  assets  and  were  reserved  for
collective use.58
Building the Idea of the Common Good in People’s Democracies
Cahiers du monde russe, 56/2-3 | 2015
10
39 The transfer of property led to an extraordinary interpenetration of the public and the
private spheres. And if this process was similar to the one that had occurred earlier in
liberal societies, it went much further in communist regimes. In Czechoslovakia, both
spheres were still clearly separated at the Liberation. During the public meeting held at
Ruzyně in September 1945, one citizen asked about property left behind by the Germans.
The Chairman of  the newly‑elected National  Committee declined to discuss in public
“questions of private interest” and recalled that “time should not be wasted in trivial
pursuits.”59 During the nationalisation and collectivisation campaigns, the state took over
a considerable range of responsibilities previously held by different private bodies. As a
result, private issues infiltrated the public sphere. From 1950, the signing of any lease
between individuals had to be formally confirmed by the city council, and every change
in private real estate had to be publicly announced.60 In September 1952, Ruzyně  city
council ordered an inventory of the entire commune’s livestock – pigs, cows, goats, and
hens – in order to obtain a general idea of all properties held by the population.61 But
state  interference  in  private  matters  often went  well  beyond simple  record‑keeping.
When,  in  August  1950,  Ruzyně’s  councillors  discussed  a  personal  request  to  build  a
garage, the debate did not concern the project’s security issues but the “origin of the
material” the claimant intended to use in order to accomplish his project.62 In August
1953,  Ruzyně’s  representatives  discussed  the  case  of  the  butcher’s  nationalised  shop
Masna. The shop assistants “should not impose other sorts of meat instead of veal, but
should only propose them,” the town councillors specified.63 Private property became a
collective issue. Through structures of collective deliberation such as the city council, the
socialist community kept an eye on the individual, his property and his behaviour, paving
the way for social engineering. 
40 The population had no choice but to accept this new situation and make a good use of it.
The  National  Committee  frequently  dealt  with  requests  related  to  housing  or  the
neighbourhood. In February 1950, Mr Hlavnička complained to the city council that Ms
Fridrichová refused tenants in her house despite having “an excessively big house.” The
National Committee unanimously decided to “confiscate two rooms of the house” and to
offer them for rent.64 Inhabitants frequently addressed the city council in order to obtain
permits to carry out work in their homes.  In April  1953,  Ms Bendová demanded “an
authorisation to transform the window in her flat” in order to allow her “blind husband
to enjoy more sunlight.”65 In January 1956, Mr Soukup complained to the city council that
Ms Chmelová and her daughter, who lived in a room on the first floor of the house, used
the toilets of his flat despite the fact that they had one on their own floor. The dispute
was handled within the Security Commission of  the city council  where “both parties
reached an agreement” during a public confrontation.66 If the public nature of private
conflicts facilitated the arbitration process, these examples show also that the socialist
community restricted the autonomy of private individuals through state structures and
violated the sense of self‑responsibility.
41 The  vocabulary  used  during  deliberations  is  extremely  revealing  in  this  regard :
“summon” the citizen to the city council, “execute” the eviction, “punish” an act. These
terms reveal an extremely authoritarian relationship between the community and the
individual. To a certain extent, the socialist community disposed of the citizen : it could
call  him  to  his  duties,  inspect  his  personal  situation  and  even  “displace”  him,  if
circumstances should require. In this extremely paternalistic set up, the public sphere
Building the Idea of the Common Good in People’s Democracies
Cahiers du monde russe, 56/2-3 | 2015
11
could not guarantee one of its fundamental functions : neutralising inequalities between
different actors intervening in public.67 
 
Creating a “Common Sphere”
42 Nationalisations  and  collectivisation  led  to  the  creation  of  the  communal  economy
(komunální  hospodářství).  Situated  between  the  bureaucratic  state  and  the  local
community, the communal economy was built on the basis of the Soviet model where the
state controlled local infrastructures through the centralised allocation of resources and
the  definition  of  economic  objectives,  while  local  communities  were  entrusted  with
everyday management through local administrations.68 The progressive expansion of the
latter’s  responsibilities  during  the  1950s  was  in  line  with  the  People’s  Democracies’
objective to “eliminate the state” and to replace it by the “government of the people.”69 In
Prague, this reorganisation of the local economy led in 1953 to the creation of 34 large
companies of the local economy in charge of producing everyday goods and providing
various services to the population (health, transport, water supply, housing, hotels and
restaurants, repairs, etc.)70 In the USSR, at the beginning of the 1960s, the communal
economy  already  employed  20 %  of  the  workforce.  State  structures  and  private
institutions merged into a single body that could be designated as a common sphere
where the collective interest was closely connected to the individual one. In this sphere,
the socialist community protected and educated the individual, a responsibility which
was  otherwise  held  by  the  family  and  the  neighbourhood.  The  socialist  community
believed it appropriate to criticise and correct the individual’s behaviour in society and to
plead in his favour with state authorities. 
43 The individual actively intervened in this common sphere.  Most often, he denounced
individual deeds at odds with the collective interest. In April 1953, the city council of
Ruzyně received a joint complaint against Ms Květová. Due to her diabetes, she benefited
from greater rations of meat “that she doesn’t use herself but resells,” according to the
complaint.71 In December 1951, Ms Blachtová protested against the “bad working morals
of the chimney sweep Mr Šípa, who often receives advances but hardly ever finishes his
work.”72 In  both  cases,  the  city  council  opened  an  investigation.  This  individual
surveillance was a fundamental aspect of the new collective nature of the public sphere in
the People’s Democracies. The community felt free to interfere in the personal life of the
individual if it was considered in his own interest. In February 1949, Ms Zavadilová was
“arrested by the police of Prague” following “remarks concerning her disordered life.”73
In the name of the same collective interest,  in July 1950,  the city council  decided to
confiscate personal  vehicles “which were not used enough” and to allocate rooms in
private flats which were considered “excessively big.”74 In March 1950, the Public Health
Commission showed up unexpectedly  at  Ms  Drncová’s  home to  investigate,  probably
following a denunciation. Members of the city council’s Security Commission accused her
of keeping a piglet in her flat at night. She apologised and explained that the pigsty was
being  repaired  so  she  enclosed  the  piglet  at  home  “only  for  security  reasons.”
Nevertheless, the piglet was confiscated.75
44 In People’s Democracies, the idea of the common good – the public sphere’s ultimate
objective – went well beyond its traditional meaning which is to reach a consensus about
what is best for all.  Within the socialist common sphere, the conditions of individual
well‑being were established by the socialist  community,  while  individual  preferences
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were not necessarily taken into consideration. The individual was subjected to the state
and to the socialist community which expected him to comply with their expectations. 
 
The Impossible Consensus over the Public‑Private
Distinction
45 The boundary between the public and the private was no longer defined according to
ownership  or  wealth,  but  according  to  political  criteria  which  were  arbitrary  and
extremely malleable. In February 1950, the Public Health Commission of the Ruzyně city
council came to the conclusion that one of the town’s houses was not being properly
maintained and decided “unanimously to notify the owner that unless he took care of his
house correctly, the house would be nationalised.”76 Councillors as well as inhabitants
referred  to  the  idea  of  “appropriate  individual  behaviour”  on  a  regular  basis.  The
definition of what “appropriate” meant depended on “obedience to the collective rules.”
In December 1950, Mr Hašek required an authorisation to build a new beehive in his
garden. The city council granted the authorisation “on condition that the claimant will
provide his quota of honey.”77 In January 1950, the Stracha family requested permission
to build a kitchen in their house. The Housing Committee endorsed the demand because
“as far as the family’s behaviour goes, it is fully engaged in the building of socialism” and
“there is no objection on a technical level.”78 
46 The lack of  definition of  “appropriate socialist  behaviour” placed the individual  in a
position of uncertainty with catastrophic long‑term consequences. A decline in initiative,
a disinterest in work, and a denial of personal responsibility are only some aspects of the
state‑owned economy during this  period.  The confusion between the  public  and the
private also led to mutual distrust between different actors intervening in public. The
“toilets of the school were once again obstructed,” noted Ruzyně city council in 1951. The
town’s representatives considered the incident of  utmost importance “because it  is  a
deliberate  act  against  the  National  Committee.”79 Consequently,  the  socialist  public
sphere could not  fulfil  one of  its  leading roles :  to  pacify  and to neutralise  conflicts
between different actors intervening in public. On the contrary, it strengthened divisions
within the socialist society. 
 
A Shift from Discussion to Management
47 Consecutive  administrative  reforms  in  post‑war  Czechoslovakia  strengthened  the
participative character of power, especially on a local level. National Committees were
designed  to  be  the  “organs  of  popular  management”  enabling  local  communities  to
decide on affairs involving them directly. The idea of the “government of the people,”
which  was  supposed  to  reinforce  the  alliance  between  elected  representatives  and
citizens,  was  an  original  answer  of  People’s  Democracies  to  the  issue  of  weakened
community ties and disinterest in politics experienced both during the interwar period
and the Second World War. Its objective was to create a strong political community which
could make decisions and form strong public opinion. While visiting Ruzyně in 1950, the
regional  representative  Jaroslav  Pachman  emphasized  the  spirit  of  a  recent
administrative reform : if access to communal affairs was previously “limited to those
who paid taxes and complied with the regime, the working‑class movement outdid all
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these failings.” Thanks to a progressive expansion of their fields of intervention, National
Committees  were  transformed  into  “a  completely  new  and  fair  organ  of  popular
management,  one of the pillars on which we will  build socialism.”80 But how did the
relationship  between  the  state  and  other  public  actors  evolve  within  these  new
institutions of people’s power ?
48 The records of the city council of Ruzyně show that communication between citizens and
representatives did not function. Eventually, the information went exclusively one way.
The city council organised regular meetings with the population called “discussion with
citizens (hovory s občany).” But despite the designation of these rendezvous, the real
objective  was  not  to  debate  local  issues  but  to  mobilise  the  population for  different
activities  organised  by  the  municipality  or  to  inform  it  about  the  decisions  of  the
representatives. In April 1952, one of the councillors “enlightened” the citizens on the
meaning of the working campaign of “5M.” The comrade Kamen “asked” women to join
the  harvest  and  “claimed”  that  those  who  let  chickens  go  to  the  fields  would  be
denounced.81 The meetings were not often used to hear requests. Certainly, citizens rarely
expressed their demands and when they did, they often touched on minor issues related
to the neighbourhood. The town’s representatives regretted this situation. “The people
should leave this timidity and give their opinions in public,” urged councillor Plešnerová
in 1952.  But such occasions were often recorded in quite impersonal terms – “it  was
demanded” ; “the citizens formed a request,” etc. – showing that these demands were
considered  rather  formally.  If  the  representatives  responded  to  a  question,  it  was
typically evasively. The context of generalised shortage and the limited resources at the
Council’s disposal often worked to sweep the topic under the table. 
49 And consecutive administrative reforms reduced interactions between representatives
and electors even further. In order to meet its expanded field of responsibilities, the city
council  progressively transferred all  discussions prior to decision‑making from public
meetings  towards  technical  commissions  from  which  the  population  was  excluded.
Proposals  of  these technical  commissions were then simply presented and confirmed
during public plenary meetings.82 In April  1956, during a city council  public meeting,
comrade Bulíčková complained about the paint in her flat peeling off. She was rebuked
that representatives were no longer supposed to discuss these kinds of affairs in public.83
The public was consequently ousted from the decision‑making process. The public did not
intervene in the deliberation anymore,  unless members of  the technical  commissions
decided otherwise.  During  plenary  meetings,  decisions  were  taken unanimously,  and
deliberations became hastier.  Henceforth,  the National Committees were described as
“organs of state power and management,” represented by the elected representatives.84
This process was interpreted as a proof of its enhanced efficiency.85 
50 Instead of being a place where opinions about the common good could be discussed, the
socialist public sphere became a space of mobilisation and information. If there was any
exchange, it became progressively ritualised.86 On a local level, National Committees took
in charge the organisation of socialist competition and different political events. On May
Day or the anniversary of the October Revolution, the local community was mobilised via
the town’s radio station.87 The city council signed “socialist contracts” with citizens for
community service, and the population was informed of its importance through mass
organisations whose members sat in local administrations. On certain occasions such as
the  anniversary  of  the  1948  Communist  coup  d’état,  city  council  meetings  were
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transformed into ritualised celebrations of the regime’s values. All these symbolic actions
were supposed to consolidate relations between community members.
51 In 1966, National Committees were redesigned in order to become “the most important
mass organisation” and “the main actor organising socialist society.”88 The goal was no
longer to take decisions, to form political community or to elaborate public opinion, but
to  mobilise  the  population.  However,  the  absence  of  any  common  communication
platform resulted in the population’s disinterest in the councillors’ work. In November
1952, during a discussion with the population, Ruzyně’s municipal hall was half empty
despite the fact that the meeting was announced on the town’s radio, a notice had been
posted in public, and personal invitations had been distributed by schoolchildren.89 The
city  council  chairman blamed “citizens’  disinterest.”  Henceforth,  movies  at  the  local
cinema opened with  reminders  about  municipal  meetings.  But  the  situation  did  not
improve and after 1953, “citizens’ discussions” were simply removed from the agenda of
municipal deliberations. They were replaced by a short fortnightly record, summarizing
audience comments that might possibly occur during public meetings. 
52 And elected representatives deserted the municipal public sphere as well. They attended
deliberations less and less frequently, especially plenary sessions and different technical
commissions. This absenteeism seemed comprehensible. If plenary sessions simply served
to  ratify  the  recommendations  of  different  technical  commissions,  and  if  these
commissions only confirmed decisions taken elsewhere, within the Communist Party or
higher administrations, it made no sense to attend this sham of a public deliberation on
the  local  level.  In  November  1952,  four  out  of  twenty  of  Ruzyně’s  council  members
apologised  for  their  absence  and  another  nine  did  not  even  bother  to  justify  their
absence.90 In certain cases,  the chairman was obliged to make decisions alone,  which
could “give the impression of interventionism.”91 
53 In  order  to  promote  participation,  Ruzyně  introduced  an  attendance  record  in
March 1952. Henceforth, the chairman would “reprimand recurring absentees and if their
behaviour did not improve,  they would be replaced.”92 These threats were reiterated
several times and were eventually successful : in April 1953, all representatives were once
again  attending  the  plenary  session.93 But  despite  their  presence,  deliberations  still
remained purposeless : their voices counted as little as before. 
54 From the end of the 1950s, with progressive de‑Stalinisation and a certain liberalisation,
discussions  between  representatives  and  the  population  seemed  to  reprise.  Even  if
information remained focused on the work of city council, the population showed a new
interest in its actions, and representatives perceived this. In January 1960, the population
of Ruzyně demanded the municipality renew the meetings with citizens. The city council
accepted, in the first instance, “every three months.” Attendance was “considerable” and
attendees expressed “deep satisfaction with the program and the tenure of the meeting
which allowed better knowledge of the city council’s actions.”94 From the close of the
1950s,  National Committees regularly called on citizens to volunteer in local matters,
better implicating the population in the development of the common good.95 The same
principle was applied when dealing with the lack of resources which was the everyday
burden of local administrations. In 1956, Ruzyně’s school needed a facelift. Due to lack of
funding,  the  refurbishing  was  approved  only  for  the  interiors  while  the  population
carried out the work in voluntary working brigades.96 The same principle was adopted in
1960 when canalisation was constructed in Karl Marx Street : the city council supplied
only the material.97 
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55 But this reconciliation between representatives and citizens was essentially the result of
circumstances and not choice, and it did not stand the test of time. Contact between
representatives  and citizens  declined progressively in  the 1970s,  despite  declarations
about the importance of close cooperation with local populations. A similar development
occurred  in  other  Soviet  bloc  countries.  At  the  beginning  of  the  1970s,  a  Soviet
representative spent on average 60 % of his working time in meetings and only 5 % with
his electors.98
 
Building the Idea of the Common Good
56 In Soviet‑type regimes, differences in social standing were not officially recognised and
the dominant social group, the working class, was largely favoured in public. Considering
this situation, how did social groups whose very existence was not recognised in public
manage to voice their opinions and to exist as autonomous political bodies ? One solution
was to become more involved in structures proposed by the regime and to transform
them into forums of discussion where issues relevant to each particular structure could
be discussed. Trade unions which were entrusted with new social responsibilities could
become  places  where  public  discussions  concerning  social  benefits  could  take  place.
Working brigades which mobilised the workforce for the plan’s fulfilment could become a
platform where workers could discuss norms with management.99 The Church continued
organising the faithful could defend freedom of worship and, by extension, other civil
liberties.100 Dissident intellectuals lived and worked on the margins of artistic structures
proposed by the regime whose existence was more or less recognised. But they could
address citizens through foreign media such as Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.
They lived and worked on the margins of  artistic structures proposed by the regime
whose existence was more or less recognised.101 The young,  uncomfortable within an
excessively  formal  Youth Union,  formed informal  groups offering more freedom and
space for alternative opinions.102 They also let their hearts speak through other media
such as popular music or fashion.103 
57 In Czechoslovakia, such as diversity of groups and opinions was more and more loudly
claimed by sociologists and intellectuals during the 1960s, at the very moment when class
antagonism was supposed to definitively vanish. A large debate opened in mass media
and academic circles about the necessity to reconsider the classical division of society
into three, non‑antagonist classes, trying to rehabilitate the role of the intelligentsia and
traditional cultural elites.104 The Communist Party followed these discussions very closely
and to a certain degree even encouraged them. And even the Communist Party could be a
forum where certain level of criticism was possible, especially during the liberalisation of
the 1960s. 
58 Despite all efforts, socialist societies remained unequal and any social structure where the
population lived, worked or entertained could potentially become an alternative public
sphere because it was within these structures that the individual interacted with others
and with the state.  And their development was encouraged by the regime, especially
within the working‑class. Taking part in these alternative public spheres was not only a
way for individuals and groups to elaborate political discourses but also to speak on their
own and thus build a distinct social identity. In this way, they participated in maintaining
a certain pluralism of cultures and social identities within socialist societies.  Without
being properly democratic, they could become potentially anti‑establishment, and they
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would largely play this role during the 1970s and 1980s. It is within these organisations
that  different  protest  movements  were  formed  and  through  isolated  initiatives
challenged the eroding social structures of the regime.105 
59 The main difficulty of the socialist public sphere was that these multiple public discourses
and  social  identities  could  not  find  common  discursive  arenas  where  they  could
communicate with each other and contribute to building an idea of the common good.
The arenas which could possibly play this role, such as city councils or the mass media,
were under the control of a single actor, the Communist Party, and dominated by its
discourse. This did not allow enough values and ideas to be discussed freely and to reach
a compromise.
60 Within  the  majority  public  sphere,  communication  between  these  groups  became
progressively more ritualised. On May Day 1952, Ruzyně city council received a postcard
from a local school. The representatives were all very pleased and “decided unanimously
to address their thanks to the school.” This exchange became a sort of tradition.106 True
exchange and a genuine dialogue vanished from this form of communication. It passed
henceforth through a system of signs and symbols which diminished the significance of
the  message  and  channelled  it  towards  a  single  objective,  the  consolidation  of  the
socialist  community.  But in the absence of  effective communication,  members of  the
socialist community became more and more distant. The extremely normative character
of the socialist public sphere strangled the dialogue between social actors and prevented
them from building  a  genuine  consensus  on  the  idea  of  the  common  good.  On  the
contrary, the socialist public sphere was seeking to impose its majority definition from
the top. The lack of discussion did not allow the relationship between the state and the
society to evolve, and the regime lost its capacity to adapt to social expectations. If this
relationship evolved, it was often in an extremely conflicting way.107 
* * *
61 In Czechoslovakia as well as in other Central and East European countries, the public
sphere during in the post‑war period ceased to be a space for dialogue. Population and
property transfers before, during and after the Second World War, along with new logics
of social stratification, guaranteed one actor, the party‑state, a near‑monopoly position in
the public sphere. In the process of decision‑making, one discourse overcame the others,
and this situation favoured a top‑down transmission of information instead of securing
an exchange of opinions. Nationalisation and collectivisation led to extreme confusion
between  public  and  private  interest  and  allowed  the  socialist  community  to  define
collective  interest  without  taking  into  account  the  individual’s  interest.  The  conflict
resulting from this process filled the public sphere with mutual distrust. Communication
in public became increasingly ritualised, legitimating the dominant position of the
party‑state  and  guaranteeing  the  dissemination  of  the  regime’s  new  values  to  the
population.  The  public  sphere  lost  its  capacity  to  serve  as  sounding  board  for  its
members’ particular interests. 
62 Marginalised or just tolerated groups engaged in other spaces where they could develop
alternative discourses. But in the absence of a common sphere of discussion, these groups
could not effectively communicate and could not develop a collective discourse about the
common good. This process progressively isolated the actors intervening in the socialist
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public sphere and deprived the political regime of the capacity to stay in touch with
social transformations. 
63 During  the  post‑war  period,  the  public  sphere  allowed  the  Czechoslovak  People’s
Democracy to channel the expectations and demands of different political actors. But this
unforced channelling transformed rapidly into an imposed one. The familiar forms of a
public sphere, such as structures of deliberation or the vote, remained in place. But their
significance progressively faded. On the local level, the deliberations of the city council
shortened, the unanimous vote became standard, and elected representatives were all
expected to join in official celebrations such as May Day. Genuine citizen’s engagement
was replaced by a simulacrum of public consent. By isolating the individual, the regime
destroyed  one  of  the  main  characteristics  of  citizens’  community  which  lies  in  the
communication between its members : a capacity to collectively define the idea of the
common good. 
64 Considering  that  the  socialist  public  sphere  did not  fulfil  the  expectations  of  all  its
members, it is important to understand why it survived so long. The micro‑level analysis
demonstrates that under certain conditions, the population adapted to the new situation
and  even  contributed  to  maintain  it.  The  first  was  that  this  form of  public  sphere
provided them with a minimum of social services.  Local representatives succeeded in
defending the interest of their community in contact with the Communist Party and the
state, even if the context of a generalised shortage made it progressively more difficult.
The  socialist  public  sphere  also  provided  several  safety  nets.  The  regime  became
progressively more tolerant towards the existence of certain spheres where marginalised
groups could voice their opinions and express their discontent, on the condition that they
did not  aspire  to  wider  social  mobilisation.  A kind of  compromise was progressively
reached :  the  regime  knew that  it  did  not  stir  up  enthusiasm and  that  it  was  only
tolerated  while  the  population  knew  that  they  were  relatively  sheltered  from  the
regime’s repressive interference on the condition that they respected pre‑defined limits.
On  this  basis,  the  population  developed  a  certain  level  of  tolerance  of  the  regime,
proportional to the fact that the regime was not perceived as systematically oppressive.
The socialist public sphere became a theatre where this compromise was negotiated. It
did not, however, succeeded in elaborating an idea of the common good.
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ABSTRACTS
The concept of  a  “public  sphere” is  generally considered inapplicable to Soviet‑type regimes
because they neither extended adequate protection to private property nor guaranteed political
pluralism.  Nevertheless,  even under  such regimes,  people  communicated about  issues  of  the
common good. This article analyses the mechanisms for public debate on the local level. It is
based  on  a  case  study  of  the  city  council  of  Ruzyně,  a  town  on  the  outskirts  of  Prague,
Czechoslovakia, during the 1950s. First, it considers how the Second World War transformed the
very nature of a citizens’ community and emphasized its proletarian character. This contributed
to a  new equilibrium between the public  and the private and determined how common and
individual interests were negotiated. As the party‑state gained a dominant position in the public
sphere, communication practices evolved and made the elaboration of the idea of the common
good more difficult.
Il est généralement considéré que le concept d’espace public ne s’applique pas aux régimes de
type soviétique puisque la propriété privée n’y bénéficiait pas d’une protection suffisante et que
le  pluralisme  politique  n’y  était  pas  garanti.  Toutefois,  même  dans  ce  type  de  régime,  les
populations échangeaient sur les sujets d’intérêt général. Cet article analyse les mécanismes de
débat public au niveau local. Il s’appuie sur une étude de cas, les délibérations au sein du conseil
municipal  de Ruzyně,  une commune des environs de Prague,  dans les  années 1950.  Il  étudie
d’abord comment la Seconde Guerre mondiale transforma la nature de la communauté citoyenne
et accentua son caractère prolétaire. Ce nouveau contexte contribua à redéfinir l’équilibre entre
la sphère privée et la sphère publique et à modifier la façon dont l’intérêt général et l’intérêt
personnel  se  négociaient.  Lorsque  l’État‑parti  acquit  une  position dominante  dans  l’espace
public, les pratiques de communication évoluèrent et rendirent plus difficile l’élaboration de la
notion d’intérêt général. 
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